The Ministry of Finance recently issued Decree 9,299/2018, which partially changed the structure of the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS). The BCPS undertakes three main activities: preventive control, repressive control and competition advocacy. The restructuring focuses on the promotion of competition advocacy in the country.
As in other jurisdictions, the Brazilian authorities have been striving to build a well-respected leniency programme. Evidence from recent years suggests that before allowing a company to benefit from its leniency programme, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence has become more demanding, requesting strong evidence of the existence of collusion, as well as proof of any (potential) impact in the country.
Under the former Brazilian merger control system, several non-classical M&A transactions were subject to merger review by the Administrative Council for Economic Defence. This broad statutory language left much room for uncertainty. With the introduction of the new law, the open-ended wording of the former law has been replaced by a list of reportable transactions.
Since the entry into force of the new Competition Law, practitioners, investors and the competition authority have spent much time discussing the review of transactions involving investment funds. Most issues in connection to these discussions arise as a result of the authority's regulation that sets forth a broad definition of 'group of companies' whenever investment funds are involved.
The year 2012 was key for the modernisation of antitrust law and policy in Brazil, with the new Competition Law finally entering into force. The new legal framework changed the dynamics of the antitrust review process – not only for the antitrust authority, which now has a new deadline to review merger cases, but also for companies, which must now deal with a ban on closing obligations during the merger review process.