The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has published the advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on foundational technologies, which seeks public comment on criteria for identifying and defining 'foundational technologies' essential to US national security. Although the ANPRM is vague, the potential for stronger control of items currently controlled as Export Administration Regulation 99 or for anti-terrorism, crime control, short supply or UN reasons should prompt comments.
The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) recently issued a final rule adding additional Huawei non-US affiliates to the Entity List, confirming the expiration of the temporary general licence and amending the so-called 'Foreign Direct Product Rule'. BIS also issued another final rule clarifying that prohibitions on Entity List entities apply regardless of the role that the entities play in a transaction.
Driven by national security concerns, over the past three years the government has taken a much more aggressive position on an array of technology issues involving China. These policy and regulatory changes range from significant new export controls and new supply chain screening of Chinese technology to efforts to jumpstart US research and development and 'reshore' manufacturing in strategic technology areas.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation Council recently published a long-awaited interim rule implementing Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2019. Essentially, the new rule prohibits government agencies from entering into, extending or renewing a contract with contractors if they use any equipment, system or service that uses certain Chinese telecoms equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system or as critical technology as part of any system.
President Trump recently signed an executive order (EO) banning 'transactions' – which have yet to be identified by the US Department of Commerce – relating to TikTok and its parent, ByteDance Ltd. The EO states that the spread of the Chinese mobile app continues to threaten the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States. In addition to concerns relating to sensitive personal data, the EO points to concerns pertaining to influence operations.
The US Department of Defence recently published a list of 20 Chinese companies that have been identified as 'Communist Chinese military companies', complying with a two-decade-old mandate that Congress issued during the Clinton administration. The takeaway for companies, universities and individuals is that they should proceed with caution and carefully conduct due diligence when dealing with China.
A new executive order has formalised Team Telecom, a previously ad hoc committee which for many years has reviewed applications for Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authorisations involving non-US parties, typically for US-international telecoms service or submarine cable landings. The committee has the primary responsibility of reviewing applications for FCC authorisations which involve foreign ownership to identify national security or law enforcement risks.
Through an array of legislative and administrative measures, the government has made significant strides in recent years to limit, and perhaps end altogether, the proliferation of Chinese-origin telecoms technology in US infrastructure. While some of the legislation is company agnostic, Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, which remains on the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List, is a primary target.
The Commerce Department recently took significant steps to revise the Export Administration Regulations to address military-civil fusion. Specifically, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued two final rules regarding licence exception civil end users and military end-use and end-user controls, as well as a proposed rule which would eliminate a provision of the licence exception additional permissive re-exports that currently authorises certain re-exports to China and other countries.
Recognising that COVID-19 is further straining humanitarian needs in sanctioned countries and complicating compliance with economic sanctions, the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control recently issued web-based guidance to remind the public of the many ways in which medical exports and other humanitarian services, supplies and donations can legally flow to sanctioned countries, offer reporting and compliance flexibility and provide some Iran secondary sanctions relief.
Like many other US government agencies, the State Department, Directorate of Defence Trade Controls (DDTC) has announced certain measures, effective immediately, to alleviate burdens caused by COVID-19 in relation to compliance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. The changes affect registration, compliance, licensing and outreach to the DDTC.
In a notification of exemptions action recently published for public inspection, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) set out a list of exemptions to its requirement for prior approval to export previously identified scarce medical personal protective equipment. However, despite its attempt to clarify previous rules and guidance, FEMA's notice has raised nearly as many questions as it answers.
In this video, International Trade Partners Kay C Georgi and Marwa M Hassoun explain how the Federal Emergency Management Agency's new rule restricting the export of face masks, respirators and other medical personal protective equipment works, as well as how to get a licence and what the penalties are.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency has exercised its delegated authority under the Defence Production Act to issue a temporary final rule (Prioritisation and Allocation of Certain Scarce or Threatened Health and Medical Resources for Domestic Use) to prohibit the export of five types of medical personal protective equipment that the government previously identified as scarce and threatened materials during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Defence Production Act (DPA) allows the president to shape the domestic industrial base for national defence preparedness, which includes emergency preparedness activities. This article addresses a number of DPA-related questions that have arisen in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, including how the administration has used the DPA in response to the crisis, what the impact of the administration's DPA-related orders and memoranda will be and what this means for exporters.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control recently issued two new FAQs clarifying that it was serious when it expanded the scope of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations with regard to reporting blocked, unblocked or rejected transactions to include any US person (or person subject to US jurisdiction) instead of just financial institutions, as previously required. In this video, Marwa M Hassoun and Kay C Georgi discuss the ramifications of the change and suggest possible clarifications.
President Trump recently issued Executive Order 13902, which places additional large swaths of the Iranian economy – and those outside Iran which support it – in the crosshairs of US sanctions. Third-country companies doing business with Iran's construction, mining, manufacturing or textiles sectors are now at greater risk of being sanctioned.
After a more than one-year wait, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has imposed controls on its first 'emerging technology' – software specially designed to automate the analysis of geospatial imagery. This software now requires a BIS authorisation to be exported or re-exported to any country other than Canada. Companies that develop or use AI to solve geospatial problems or in geospatial applications must review the new rules closely.
The State Department has finally brought the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) into the 21st century by releasing an interim final rule adopting the cloud computing encryption standards that the Commerce Department adopted in 2015. The good news is that, for the most part, the State Department resisted the temptation to do something different in the ITAR, so the joint Commerce-State solution works.
In the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act and the Export Control Reform Act, Congress essentially gave the Department of Commerce the authority to decide how narrowly or widely to set the jurisdiction for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States over non-passive minority investments involving emerging and foundational technologies. Yet, at times, the department has seemed almost paralysed by this question.
The US State Department recently solicited feedback on its draft US Government Guidance for the Export of Hardware, Software and Technology with Surveillance Capabilities and/or Parts/Know-How. The draft guidance aims to provide insight to exporters on the considerations to weigh prior to exporting items with intended and unintended surveillance capabilities and could foreshadow new export controls and a US State Department review.
Among other recent blows to Huawei, the Department of Defence, the General Services Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have issued an interim rule amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation to implement a key provision of the John S McCain National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019. In light of this, US companies should carefully review their transactions with Chinese tech companies to ensure that they do not fall foul of any prohibitions.
President Trump recently signed an executive order, freezing all assets in which the Venezuelan government has an interest that are in US hands and prohibiting US persons from conducting transactions with the Venezuelan government, unless specifically exempted or authorised. Although this is not an embargo on all trade with Venezuela, the executive order goes substantially further than the previous sanctions.
The US State Department recently announced the issuance of another round of sanctions on the Russian government in relation to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 1991, which will come into effect on 19 August 2019. While this second round of sanctions is unlikely to affect most US companies, it may affect US banks, but only with respect to transactions involving non-ruble bonds and funds from the Russian sovereign issued after 26 August 2019.
US secondary sanctions are sanctions that the United States can apply to wholly non-US actors in wholly non-US transactions of which the US administration disapproves. A sanctioned individual or entity can be put on the Specially Designated Nationals list, but there is no well-defined numerical threshold for imposing sanctions. This article identifies some of the problems with the application of secondary sanctions and offers some potential solutions.
A company recently entered into a $400,000, 18-month consent agreement with the Department of State, Directorate of Defence Trade Controls (DDTC) to settle six alleged violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The key issue was the company's ITAR empowered official, who was neither empowered nor an expert. Through this consent agreement, the DDTC is sending a message to the industry: an empowered official must have (among other things) sufficient authority to stop a transaction.
The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued a final rule which added five recently developed or developing technologies to the Export Administration Regulations' Commerce Control List that are essential to US national security. In particular, BIS amended four export control classification numbers and added a new one. These changes came into force on 23 May 2019 and have an immediate impact on parties exporting the newly controlled goods.
Between the addition of Huawei Technologies Co Ltd – the world's largest telecoms equipment maker – to the Entity List and a new executive order declaring a national emergency relating to information and communications technology and services, May 2019 has proved to be a period of non-stop excitement for the export control world. This article discusses what these changes mean for US companies.
President Donald Trump recently issued an executive order authorising broad new sanctions with respect to the steel, aluminium, iron and copper sectors of Iran. The announcement came hours after Iran announced that it would no longer fully comply with elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The executive order is a major expansion of existing statutory secondary sanctions which relate to steel and aluminium and also addresses two new sectors – copper and iron.
After years of waiting, the new 22 CFR 126.4 International Traffic in Arms Regulations licence exemption for transfers of defence articles and services by or for the US government has come into effect. While the introduction of the revised exemption is largely positive for exporters, there are a few new boxes to check.
In a strike against Nicolás Maduro and his supporters, the Trump administration recently announced a new executive order. Pursuant to Executive Order 13850, US persons are now broadly prohibited from engaging in transactions with Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA), including its majority-owned subsidiaries. However, the Office of Foreign Assets Control has rolled out a slew of general licences authorising US persons to engage in certain transactions involving PDVSA and its majority-owned subsidiaries.
President Trump recently announced the United States' intention to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and re-impose secondary sanctions on Iran. The announcement was accompanied by wind-down periods during which non-US persons could wrap up transactions entered into prior to 8 May 2018. The final wind-down period recently expired and secondary sanctions were re-imposed on a broad swathe of Iranian persons and sectors of Iran's economy.
The US State Department recently explained the waivers of the chemical and biological weapon sanctions against the Russian government, confirming that many exports – even of national security-controlled items – can still be exported to Russia. In short, unless the Trump administration imposes additional sanctions in three months' time, the effects on commercial business with Russia should be limited. However, these measures must still be implemented by the various government agencies.
The US administration recently announced that it will be imposing sanctions on the Russian government under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act 1991 over the use of a novichok nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate UK citizen Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal. Of the five sanctions to be imposed, the fifth – the prohibition on the export of national security-controlled items to the Russian government – is likely the most significant.