The High Court has dismissed a judicial review challenge to a finding by the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that Deliveroo riders are not workers. The High Court ruled that the riders are not in an employment relationship for the purposes of EU law.
In November 2017 the CAC rejected an application from the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) for collective bargaining rights in respect of Deliveroo riders. The CAC ruled that Deliveroo riders are not workers within the meaning of Section 296 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act's definition (for further details please see "Deliveroo defends union recognition application by demonstrating riders are genuinely self-employed"). An individual is a 'worker' if they work, normally work or seek to work:
- under a contract of employment; or
- under any other contract whereby they undertake to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract who is not a professional client of theirs.
The case turned on the second worker definition. Deliveroo was successful because the CAC found that Deliveroo riders had a genuine right to use a substitute to perform deliveries – a right which was inherently incompatible with an obligation to provide personal service. This decision meant that the IWGB could not proceed with its application for compulsory recognition in respect of a group of riders in Camden and Kentish Town.
The IWGB sought permission to proceed with a judicial review of the CAC's ruling on five grounds, all but one of which the High Court rejected. It allowed the challenge to proceed with some hesitation on a single ground – namely, that the CAC had not properly dealt with the IWGB's secondary submission on the effect of collective bargaining rights in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (for further details please see "High Court dismisses Pimlico Plumbers challenge to Deliveroo contract"). The IWGB contended that the definition of worker in Section 296 and the obligation of personal performance should be interpreted in a way that does not exclude riders from exercising their Article 11 rights.
Following a full hearing, the High Court dismissed the IWGB's challenge. The main points of its judgment were as follows:
- Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not engaged. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights did not support the union's submissions that Deliveroo riders were workers in the circumstances of this case. Specifically, the riders had not been in an employment relationship with Deliveroo for the purposes of domestic or EU law.
- Even if Article 11 had been engaged, the interference with the riders' rights would have been justified. Restrictions are permitted where they are "necessary in a democratic society… for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". In this case, the restriction was rationally connected to the objective of preserving freedom of business and contract, by limiting the cases in which the burden of collective bargaining should apply.
- The definition of worker achieved a fair balance between competing interests. The interference with rights was limited, as it did not prevent riders from joining unions or making voluntary arrangements. It merely precluded them from making use of the UK's legal mechanism for compulsory union recognition. In this regard, the High Court noted that the three matters covered by collective bargaining, and for which compulsory collective bargaining could be enforced, were pay, hours and holiday. Hours and holiday had no real significance where there was no obligation to work personally, while discussion of pay was limited by the absence of such an obligation.
- Even if this was wrong, Section 296 could not be 'read down' in the way that the union contended. The IWGB argued that 'normally works' should be read as meaning that the workforce normally worked personally, as opposed to what the contract permitted. Rejecting this, the High Court said that the question was whether the contract, under which the individual normally worked, contained a personal work obligation – and it did not.
- The High Court also rejected the IWGB's argument that it could adopt a dominant feature test, drawing on the Supreme Court's judgment in Pimlico Plumbers (for further details please see "Supreme Court confirms Pimlico Plumbers are workers"). That decision clarified that personal obligation was the sole test, which could not be usurped by a dominant feature test. It was also not possible to achieve the outcome that the union argued for by reading the words or otherwise into the Section 296 test. That would achieve the opposite meaning from Parliament's intention: each option the IWGB contended for was inconsistent with the provision's underlying thrust.
Although permission for judicial review had been granted on limited grounds, the judgment provides important guidance on what constitutes an 'employment relationship' in the context of EU human rights law. It emphatically endorses Deliveroo's position that riders are genuinely self-employed and puts to rest any suggestion that, following the Pimlico Plumbers ruling, the correct test for determining whether someone is a worker is anything other than whether they have an obligation to work personally.
The High Court clarified that cases such as these are fact specific, and there are not necessarily any wider implications for other gig economy companies given the wide variety of different operating models. Nonetheless, this is an important development in the burgeoning debate over regulation in this area with the government's formal response to its consultations following the Taylor Review expected soon (for further details please see "Government response to Taylor review – a damp squib?"). Deliveroo remains the only gig economy company to have been successful in any of the recent spate of employment status cases.(1)
For further information on this topic please contact Colin Leckey at Lewis Silkin by telephone (+44 20 7074 8000) or email ([email protected]). The Lewis Silkin website can be accessed at www.lewissilkin.com.
This article was first published by the International Law Office, a premium online legal update service for major companies and law firms worldwide. Register for a free subscription.
