Since the start of 2018, following a period in which it focused on the persecution of cartels, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) has directed more resources towards concluding pending abuse of dominance matters and occasionally launching new dominance cases. In so doing, the most pertinent question has become: how will CADE deal with dominance in future?
The Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) and the Central Bank recently entered into a memorandum of understanding. This initiative strengthens the relationship between the two authorities and promotes greater cooperation among them for the analysis of merger cases and anti-competitive practices by financial institutions. It also represents an important step forward, signalling the end to the longstanding dispute between CADE and the Central Bank over jurisdictional conflicts.
The Ministry of Finance recently issued Decree 9,299/2018, which partially changed the structure of the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS). The BCPS undertakes three main activities: preventive control, repressive control and competition advocacy. The restructuring focuses on the promotion of competition advocacy in the country.
As in other jurisdictions, the Brazilian authorities have been striving to build a well-respected leniency programme. Evidence from recent years suggests that before allowing a company to benefit from its leniency programme, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence has become more demanding, requesting strong evidence of the existence of collusion, as well as proof of any (potential) impact in the country.
Under the former Brazilian merger control system, several non-classical M&A transactions were subject to merger review by the Administrative Council for Economic Defence. This broad statutory language left much room for uncertainty. With the introduction of the new law, the open-ended wording of the former law has been replaced by a list of reportable transactions.